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We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the pop-
ulation, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants
to make the choice of the minority, while the rest want to make the majority choice. This resembles opinion
spreading with “contrarian” agents, but has the game theoretic aspect that agents try to optimize their own situ-
ation in ways that are incompatible with the common good. When this fraction is less than 1/2, the population
can efficiently self-organize to a state where agents get what they want—the majority (i.e. the majority seekers)
have one opinion, the minority seekers have the other. If the fraction is larger than 1/2, there is a frustration
in the population that dramatically changes the dynamics. In this region, the population converges, through
some distinct phases, to a state of approximately equal-sized opinions. Just over the threshold the state of the
population is furthest from the collectively optimal solution.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc,89.75.-k,89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Simple models of human behavior can help us understand
population-wide phenomena in society [2]. The purpose of
such models is usually not to forecast some social process,
but rather to link behavioral causes to population-level effects,
in other words, to explore possible social mechanisms. In this
paper, we combine two well-studied scenarios—collective de-
cision making and the minority game. We assume that agents
are faced with a binary decision to choose one of two “opin-
ions”. We assume that they can access the current opinion of
other agents. When the information is consistent enough, they
decide on one opinion and never revert it. This scenario of de-
cision making was also studied in Ref. [8]. We add another
element to this scenario, namely that a fraction φ of the agents
that would prefer minority choice [3]. In the minority game,
all agents want to be in the minority. Having a mix of minor-
ity and majority seekers introduces an interesting tension in
the decision making [12]. In statistical physics terms, the sys-
tem becomes frustrated—the constraints on the system force
the configuration to be locally suboptimal.
To study this situation, we need additional assumptions
about what information is accessible to the agents. We as-
sume that they are unaware of the fraction of minority seek-
ers, and we argue that for a majority seeker a good and simple
strategy is to decide on the opinion that it perceives is prevail-
ing in the population, while minority seekers decide on the
opposite opinion. This idea has been explored for the voter
model [13, 15], where it has been shown to fundamentally
change the model behavior. As we will see, this strategy fares
better, on average, than other simple strategies like choosing
a random opinion independent of the others’ opinion or just
sticking to one opinion.
There are many papers investigating the effects of contrar-
ians—agents that somehow act in the exact opposite way to
the others. In the voter model, this behavior is implemented
in a similar way to our model [13, 15]. The difference is that
the agents in a voter model only remember the last interaction,
while in our model they are able to integrate the information
for an arbitrarily distant past. The same is true for the ma-
jority voter model [11], where an agent updates its opinion
to the majority of its neighborhood. In this case, contrarian
agents can change their opinion to a minority opinion if they
have a higher number of neighbors, i.e., degree, than the aver-
age [10]. Another model of opinion dynamics with contrarian
agents was proposed by Galam [6]. In that model, the opin-
ions are spread by normal agents taking the majority opinion
of randomly sampled groups, and the contrarians taking the
minority opinion. In Ref. [6], Galam argues that this can ex-
plain surprising voting results. Our problem differs from this
model in three aspects. First, our agents can remember more
information of their past encounters. Second, our model could
straightforwardly be applied to arbitrary interaction topolo-
gies, like networks. Third, our agents are selfish in the vein
of game theory (in particular, the minority game [3]). Indeed,
the minority with contrarian agents have been studied [16],
which is however a quite different problem in that the contrar-
ian agents differ in their strategies, not their goals.
In this paper, we will first derive the model, then get some
ideas about the dynamics from examples, and finally study
the results for all parameter values, except the number N of
agents. Indeed, all parameters, including N, would be inter-
esting to study, but to restrict the scope we make a case study
for a large value of N, and leave the asymptotics for future
studies.
II. DERIVING THE MODEL
We assume that N agents are faced with a binary decision.
Like in an election, once they have made their decision they
cannot undo it. The agents gather information about the deci-
sion from interaction with others, either on a complete graph
or on a two-dimensional lattice. Once they think the informa-
tion is conclusive enough, they finalize their decision. In the
model, we represent the current state of gathered information
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the behavior of the spatial version of the model for the extreme values of φ. The upper row shows the time evolution of
the state variable si for a situation when all agents are majority seekers. The lower row shows the situation with only minority seekers. The
initial condition is p = 1/2, i.e. the si is set to 1 or −1 with equal probability. The decision threshold θ is 10.
by an integer state variable si for each agent i. The initial con-
figuration is a random distribution of ±1, i.e., 1 with probabil-
ity p, otherwise −1. p can thus control the initial information
content, or the general sentiment in the population when the
decision process starts. The magnitude of si represents the
consistency of the information that the agent i has been ex-
posed to. If the magnitude of si exceeds an integer threshold
value θ, which we call a decision threshold, the agent makes
the decision (whereupon it is never changed). During an inter-
action, an agent influences the other by the sign of si, where
we assume that the magnitude of si does not matter. If i inter-
acts with j at time t, then
si(t + 1) = si(t) + sgn s j(t) (1)
where
sgn x =

1 if x > 0
0 if x = 0
−1 if x < 0
. (2)
In [8], Gro¨nrund et al. studied this model on various network
topologies when all agents are majority seekers, i.e., φ = 0.
They showed that the population can efficiently integrate the
initial information. To implement the minority or majority
seeking, we note that φ = 1/2 divides the parameter space
into two game-theoretically different regions. If φ < 1/2 (i.e.
a majority of the population is majority seekers), then a mi-
nority seeker can just reverse its opinion when it makes the
decision. In other words, if |si| = θ during the updates by
Eq. (1), then si is replaced by −si. If φ > 1/2, then the situa-
tion becomes much more complex. Without knowledge about
which agents have fixed their opinions, it is probably hard to
beat a random choice of si. However, since we also assume
that the agents are unaware of φ, we need to have the same
strategy throughout the parameter space. Thus we stick to the
strategy for all φ-values—also minority seekers reversing their
opinion when fixing their opinion (i.e. taking a decision). We
will later argue that this strategy is more efficient than simpler
strategies on average.
We summarize the model as follows:
1. For all i, initialize si to 1 with probability p, otherwise
−1.
2. Pick a random agent i and a random neighbor j of i.
3. If |si| < θ, update si according to Eq. (1).
4. Increment time t to t + 1/N (to let one unit of time rep-
resent the average time between updates of si for a par-
ticular i).
5. If now |si| = θ, then with a probability φ replace si by
−si.
6. Unless all agents have |si| = θ, repeat from step 2.
We can think of si as performing a random walk on the
integers until it reaches a distance θ where it gets stuck
(possibly also changing sign). The probability of going
in the positive direction depends on the states of other
agents, which makes standard analytically solutions hard.
It is straightforward to generalize the model to an arbi-
trary topology—in step 2, just pick j as a neighbor of i.
In this paper, we will use a fully-connected or well-mixed
topology and a square grid with periodic boundary condi-
tions. A NetLogo implementation of the square-grid ver-
sion of the model can be found at http://petterhol.me/
majority-minority-decision-making/.
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FIG. 2. Illustration of the all-minority-seeker case with a larger decision threshold (θ = 50) which separates the time evolution into different
phases. Panel (a) shows snapshots of the population for different times. Panel (b) shows the time evolution of the average opinion q and the
fraction of agents with fixated opinions f . The dots on the curves mark the snapshots in panel (a). Here we took p = 1 so that initially all
agents have si = 1.
We use N = 10, 000 agents, implying a lattice of size 100×
100 for square grids, and 104–105 independent runs for the
statistical analysis. These give so good statistics that error bars
representing standard error would be smaller than the symbol
size in all our plots and are thus omitted.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We will analyze the model numerically through three quan-
tities: the average opinion q, i.e., the average value of sgn si,
the average fraction σ of agents in the desired opinion group
(majority seekers in the majority, minority seekers in the mi-
nority), and the fraction f of agents with |si| = θ.
A. Time evolution
Our model defines a non-equilibrium process that eventu-
ally reaches a fixed state where eventually si = ±θ for all
i. This construction is more than just for convenience—since
we are modeling a decision process (influenced by opinion
spreading) it makes sense that all agents eventually make fixed
decisions. Many opinion spreading models, like the voter
model [4, 11, 13, 15], also share this feature, although there is
no explicit rule of decision in the original voter model. Maybe
it is not so surprising that for some parameter values, the con-
figurations of our model resemble those of the voter model.
See Fig. 1 for a simulation on a square-lattice topology with
θ = 10 and p = 1/2. For φ = 0, i.e., when all agents are major-
ity seekers, the model converges to the characteristic coarse-
grained patches of the spatial voter model [4]. A larger θ will
give larger patches and smoother edges of the patch bound-
aries. In the θ → ∞ limit the patch boundaries will have
zero curvature, i.e., they will be bands across the square grid.
When φ = 1, i.e., all agents are minority seekers, the final
state shows a local checkerboard pattern. (By “locally” we
mean that there are boundaries, like dislocations in a crystal,
where the checkerboard pattern is broken.) In the θ → ∞
limit the converged configuration is expected to be a perfect
checkerboard pattern.
When there is a majority of minority seekers and the de-
cision threshold is comparatively large, the time evolution be-
comes segmented into distinct phases. In Fig. 2, we show such
a situation starting from a configuration with all agents having
si = 1, i.e., p = 1 and θ = 50. Naturally agents start reaching
the decision threshold around t = 50. Since minority seekers
revert their opinions when taking their decision, we can see
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FIG. 3. The average opinion q depending on the decision threshold θ. Panels (a)–(c) represent fully connected networks; panels (d)–(f) show
the results on square grids. Panels (a) and (d) show q for various values of φ and p = 0.51; panels (b) and (e) show the results for the population
of only majority seekers (φ = 0) and various values of p; panels (c) and (f) show the results for the population of only minority seekers (φ = 1).
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FIG. 4. The ratio of satisfied agents σ as a function of the decision threshold θ. The panels correspond to the panels of Fig. 3.
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FIG. 5. The average opinion q as a function of the fraction of minor-
ity seekers φ. Panels (a) and (b) show the results for fully connected
networks; panels (c) and (d) are the corresponding panels for square
grids. Panels (a) and (c) have p = 0.51; panels (b) and (d) have
p = 1.
the fixated agents as white squares on an otherwise dark back-
ground (black square representing si = θ and white square
representing si = −θ) appearing in Fig. 2(a) at t = 27 and
t = 38. These fixed agents of negative si will give a negative
influence to the other agents they are interacting with. In other
words, the overall rate of decision slows down until t ≈ 130
when agents start reaching si = −θ threshold. For the square
grid, this is an overdamped oscillation. In other words, we
will not see more plateaus by extending Fig. 2(b)— f ′′(t) = 0
at three, but not more than three, t values.
Our model has some similarities to the Ising model [1] and
related models of disordered systems [14]. When the interac-
tion is ferromagnetic, the ground state has all spins pointing
in the same direction (not unlike, but not identical to when
φ = 0 and θ → ∞). For negative interaction, i.e., the anti-
ferromagnetic Ising model, the ground state is a checkerboard
pattern like φ = 1. There differences too—the structure of
the configurations change if one tunes φ, whereas intermedi-
ate (non-zero) coupling strengths of the Ising model all have
the same ground states.
B. Dependence on the decision threshold
Our first statistical analysis concerns how the average opin-
ion depends on the decision threshold. When φ < 1/2, as θ
increases, the average opinion stabilizes fast to a value very
close to q = 1 − 2φ, see Fig. 3(a). This is true for all p & 0.55
as can be seen in Fig. 3(b) where we plot q for various val-
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FIG. 6. Here we investigate how σ depends on φ. Panels (a) and
(b) display the results for fully connected networks; panels (c) and
(d) show the corresponding figures for square grids. (a) and (c) have
p = 0.51; (b) and (d) have p = 1.
ues of p in a population of only majority seekers. The fact
that q levels off at values less than 1 for 1/2 < p . 0.55 is
probably due to a finite size effect. Even though the binomial
distribution of the initial opinion is so narrow that the dynam-
ics of the population extremely rarely starts from a majority
of −1 for these values, the population could move toward the
negative opinion by chance. In other words, even if p > 1/2,
for small enough population sizes, the symmetry is effectively
not broken.
When φ > 1/2, the situation is dramatically different. Now
the average opinion is less than zero for most, but not all, θ
values. First q grows to a maximum around θ = 10 (which is
fairly independent of φ), then it drops to a minimum around
θ = 30, whereupon q starts increasing towards 0. This behav-
ior is probably related to the phases seen in of Fig. 2. How
well the information is integrated within the population at the
time agents start fixating their opinions depends on θ. If many
agents reach the decision threshold θ around the same time,
the minority seekers would choose sgn si = −1 and the influ-
ence of the new negative agents would not be large enough
to stop −1 from becoming the majority. This can explain the
decrease of q to the minimum around θ = 30. Another in-
teresting, but hard to explain, observation is that the q-curve
for φ = 1 is not extreme—the lowest q-values occur when
φ ≈ 0.8.
In Fig. 3(b) and (c), we look at the extreme cases of only
majority or minority seekers, respectively. We see that when
φ = 0 (only majority seekers, Fig. 3(b)) the opinions converge
fast with θ. For φ = 1, on the other hand, q(θ) always follows
an increase-decrease-increase form. For both φ = 0 and φ = 1
the curves converge for p & 0.51 and θ & 50. The effect
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FIG. 7. Plotting how σ depends on . Panel (a) shows the results for
the fully connected topology, and panel (b) displays the results for
square grids. θ = 2560 was used for both panels. Data points for
φ ≤ 0.505 are excluded as the theory applies to large φ. The solid
line shows σ = .
of increasing θ is obviously to better integrate opinions in the
population—the larger θ, the higher “collective intelligence.”
Apparently this effect expires at some point, presumably all
available information is integrated around θ = 50.
The lower panels of Fig. 3 show the results for two-
dimensional square grids, corresponding to the upper panels
of the same Figure. Most observations for the fully-connected
case hold for the square grids too, but the effects are weaker.
For example, q does not visually converge as θ increases at
least up to θ = 2560. For the all-minority-seekers case, q
never becomes positive.
Another way of characterizing the model is to look at the
fraction σ of agents that reach their goal, i.e., the fraction of
majority seekers to end up in the majority and minority seek-
ers to end up in the minority. The σ plots corresponding to
Fig. 3 are shown in Fig. 4. The behavior of σ follows the
same general picture as q. We note that in the fully connected
topology, for large enough values of decision threshold and
with a majority being majority seekers, all agents will eventu-
ally be satisfied. In case with square grids, only large values
of p will lead to σ = 1.
It is well known that information spreads slower in square
grids—the graph distances scale like
√
N for square grids
compared to the constant for fully connected topology. Many
sociophysics models [2] show a qualitatively different behav-
ior on lattices of low-enough dimensions, compared to fully
connected topologies. Briefly stated, the weaker coupling at
a distance for the low-dimensional lattices makes autocorrela-
tions to decay slower, and thus fluctuations to become larger.
In our case, these effects are not so strong that the behavior is
fundamentally different for the square grids. The largest dif-
ference could be that the minima of q and σ as functions of θ
vanish for some values of p (see Figs. 3 and 4).
C. Dependence on the ratio of minority seekers
We already noted that the dynamics of the model changes
dramatically with φ. In particular, φ = 1/2 seems to be a
boundary between two radically different behaviors. In Fig. 5,
we plot the average opinion as a function of the fraction of
minority seekers. We see that for φ > 1/2, q is always negative
(i.e., always opposite of the initial average opinion). We also
note that the average q over all φ is positive, meaning that
the strategy built into the model is better than trivial strategies
like everyone making a random choice, or everyone choosing
si = 1. On the other hand, if the agents were aware of φ, a
better strategy would be to make a random choice if φ > 1/2,
and the same as above otherwise.
Comparing the fully connected topology and the square
grid, we can once more conclude that the spreading of the
information is much slower in the square grid—even for the
largest values of θ, if φ is small, q is still not far from 0. On
the other hand, for the fully connected topology, the popula-
tion can integrate the information so that q gets close to one.
The behavior of q as a function of φ is, however, far from
as dramatic as the behavior of σ (see Fig. 6). For the fully
connected case, when φ crosses 1/2, σ drops from 1 to 0 over
a small interval. That σ can be so low is quite remarkable. It
means that almost all majority seekers end up in the minority
and vice versa. Slightly below φ = 1/2, almost all the majority
seekers choose sgn si = +1, which is the majority opinion, and
almost all the minority seekers choose sgn si = −1. Slightly
above φ = 1/2, the choice of si are almost the same, while the
majority opinion is now negative.
For yet larger φ, there is a mix of sgn si = +1 and −1, so
that σ gets closer to 1/2. In general, since for φ > 1/2 the
number of agents that cannot be in their desired subpopulation
grows linearly with φ, the upper bound of σ (if the agents
could unselfishly maximize σ) is
maxσ =
{
1, φ < 1/2
3/2 − φ, φ ≥ 1/2 . (3)
The effect of the lower dimensionality of the square grid
is, as observed above, to dampen the response of parameter
changes—this effect is even more dramatic for σ than for q.
To get a bit more nuanced picture of the dynamics when φ is
large (well above 1/2), recall that there are two ways an agent
can end up with a negative opinion: Either they are minority
seekers reaching the positive threshold θ, or they are majority
seekers reaching the negative threshold, i.e., −θ. Let  be the
fraction of agents reaching the negative threshold. Then, when
the simulations have converged, the states will be distributed
as
P(s = θ) = (1 − )(1 − φ) + φ, (4a)
P(s = −θ) = (1 − )φ + (1 − φ), (4b)
P(s) = 0 for − θ + 1 ≤ s ≤ θ − 1, (4c)
leading to
q = (1 − 2φ)(1 − 2), (5)
or, equivalently (remember, we assume φ > 1/2)
 =
1
2
− q
2 − 4φ . (6)
Figure 5 shows that q is always negative for φ > 1/2. From
Eq. (6), we can see that this means that  < 1/2, i.e., most
7agents reach the positive threshold. The minority seekers end-
ing up in the minority, contributing to σ, are those who reach
the negative threshold and thus take a positive opinion. The
fraction of these agents is φ. The majority seekers ending
up in majority are those reaching the negative threshold. A
fraction (1 − φ) belongs to this category. Summing these
contributions gives the simple relation
σ = , (7)
which we verify in Fig. 7. It holds very well for all p-values
larger than 0.55 and, remarkably, at even lower p-values for
square grids. Why this approximate calculation works better
for square grids is a question we have to leave for future stud-
ies.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied a model of collective decision making
where a fraction of the population tries to be in the minor-
ity. The model shows a complex time evolution and parameter
dependence when there is a majority of minority seekers and
thus a built-in “frustration” in the population by analogy to
statistical physics models. When we increase φ beyond 1/2,
the agents go from a collective optimum where everyone gets
what they want, to the worst performance of the model—in
some cases almost everyone end up in the group they do not
want to be in. One can argue that this is an artifact from the bi-
nary nature of the model—in many real situations a minority
seeker would not be too disappointed to be in a small majority
as in a large majority, so this effect is superficial. On the other
hand, there are many “winner takes it all” situations in society,
voting being one example.
Other simple models of social systems, e.g., in Refs. [5]
and [7], have addressed the coexistence of opinions in collec-
tive decision making. Our model gives another mechanism
where the goals of the agents with respect to the majority and
minority opinions create the coexistence. The special nature
of φ = 1/2 was also noted in Ref. [12] who also studied a
mixed population of majority and minority seekers, but acting
based on previous encounters as in the traditional minority-
game setting.
There are interesting future directions from this work. An
obvious limitation is the strategy to choose the opinion that
creates very low values of the average satisfaction—much
lower than the theoretical limit Eq. (3). Is the theoretical limit
unattainable with selfish agents and limited communication?
We think so. Note that there is no Nash equilibrium in this
model, in the sense that when φ > 1/2 there will always be
agents that would have fared better if they choose the oppo-
site opinion. Probably selfish agents would never reach over
σ = 1/2. At the same time, there might be better, more elabo-
rate strategies, exploiting the information in |si|, or rather how
close to θ that |si| is, to fine-tune the decision. We hope future
studies can resolve these questions.
Another issue is how to extrapolate the results to the N →
∞ limit like in Refs. [8, 15]. There are two parameters in our
model: N the number of agents which sets the total amount
of information in the population and θ which sets the amount
of information one agent can process in the decision process.
The most generous assumption, as far as the precision of the
decision is concerned, is to assume the limit N → ∞ and
N/θ → 0. In this limit, the agents have access to as much
information as possible and they also base their decision on
as much information processing as possible. In Fig. 4(a), in-
creasing the decision threshold also increases σ, for the fully
connected case. This suggests that the model could reach
σ = 1 for φ < 1/2 and σ = 1/2 for φ > 1/2. For the square
grids, such a performance seems unattainable. To establish
these limits would be an interesting future direction.
Finally, extending the model beyond binary decisions
would be interesting. For some models [9], one needs the
number of opinions to be an extensive quantity to see phase
transitions. One could also imagine decision making with
continuous variables or in higher dimensional spaces.
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